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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOGAN, 
OF LOGAN, UTAH, a National 
Banking Association, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
No. 
10621 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF SUPPORTS APPELLANT'S 
POSITION THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
LEGISLATURE TO CHANGE THE LANGUAGE OF 
THE BRANCH BANKING STATUTE. 
In its argument in Walker Bank v. Taylor, 15 U. 2d 
:234, 390 P. 2d 592 (which argument was adopted by the 
Comt), Walker Bank contended that the Utah Branch 
Banking Statute was plain and unambiguous and admin-
istrntive interpretations should not induce the court to 
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vary "the very unambiguous terms of our branch hanki11rr 
h 
statutes." This conclusion was bolstered by the fact th,tt 
:-he state legislature specifically provided in 1953 that: 
"From and after the effective elate of this act no unit 
bank and no branch shall be established or author-
ized to conduct a banking business except as hercin-
before in Section 7-3-6 expressly provided." (Section 
7-3-6.3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). 
\Valker Bank now contends that the Court should 
vary the plain words of the Statute because a Federal 
District Court (Michigan National Bank v. Saxon, Civil 
No. 821-62, D. D. C. July 25, 1962, not reported) said 
that a drive-in facility 500 feet from the main office was 
not an additional branch if it is not operated as "a separate 
and independent office operating in the same way as 
branch banks generally operate" even though such word-
ing is not contained in the branch bank definition. 
Two other Federal District Courts disagreed with 
the conclusion reached in the Michigan National Bank 
case. In State Chartered Banks in Washington v. Peoples 
National Bank, Civil No. 6338, W. D. \Vash., February 28, 
1966 a proposed facility 260 feet from the principal office 
having a different address was held to be a branch even 
though presumably not operated as a separate and inde-
pendent office. And a drive-in facility 290.52 feet from 
the main bank building and separated by businesses and 
by an alley was held to be a branch in Jackson v. First 
National Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134 (M. D. Ga. 1965). 
If courts interpreting the same language cannot agree 
as to the circumstances that are necessary to vary the 
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1
d:lin words of the legislatme, can it be said that the 
lc'<>islatme must have intended that an additional office, 
0 
homing a separate teller, who receives deposits and pays 
, ·lwcks, who is separated from the main branch banking 
off ice by an alley and a separate office is not an additional 
offi<'C' for receiving deposits and paying checks and there-
{orc a hrm1ch, The fact that Respondent is able to find 
l 1ui one F('rlcral Court that has taken the liberty of extencl-
rng the plain language of the legislature seems to imply 
that the cldinition of "additional office" or "branch" is 
phin and that the lPgislature intended that the State 
Ru1k Commissioner should control all expansion of exist-
111g lacilitics which involve establishing additional offices 
11 h( re deposits are received or checks paid. Since the 
l :tah definition and the Federal definition of branch 
hanb are identical, we submit that the disagreement 
among Federal Comts as to the interpretation thereof 
illflicatcs any extension or modification of the language 
is ~ problem for the legislatme. 
Walker Bank also contends that because the State 
B:n1k Commissioner has ignored the opinion of the At-
1 orney Gc11eral (Novemher 8, 19.57) and has not con-
tested expansion hy state banks, that this Court should 
acquiesce in his failure to take action. This position was 
rejPcted in \Valker Bank v. Taylor, supra. 
Walker Bank concedes that the Attorney General of 
FtJh in 1957 stated that a separate facility, 141 feet from 
1 ltc main hanking house was a branch under the plain 
language of our branch banking statutes. But Walker 
ll:nk says we should ignore this opinion because a new 
State Rrnk Commissioner took no action when Continental 
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Bank and Beehive State Bank established drive-in facilities 
separate from their existing bank. Of course, action by 
the State Bank Commissioner against these two banks 
would have accomplished little since both banks had an 
unlimited right to branch in Salt Lake City under thr 
provisions of our statute and such offices could have been 
authorized under the express provisions of Section 7-3-6. 
·walker Bank also contends that because the Comp-
troller of the Currency has taken no action against First 
Security Bank in its establishment of drive-in facilities, 
this Court should enlarge the meaning of the Utah statutf' 
on branch banking. The Comptroller's position that he 
is not bound by state procedural restrictions on branch 
banking is well known (see Walker Bank v. Saxon, 234 F. 
Supp. 74, .'352 F. 2d 90, cert. granted 34 U. S. Law Weck 
.1377 No. 875; and First National Bank of Smithfield v. 
Saxon, 352 F. 2d 267). Obviously the Comptroller is 
not going to take action against First Security Bank if it 
means he may have to take a position contrary to the 
position for which he is presently contending. 
POINT II 
THE OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CITED BY RESPONDENT SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
POSITION. 
Walker Bank contends that the Attorney General's 
opinion of March 25, 1966 modifies the opinion of Novem-
ber 8, 1957 and should be followed by this Court. But 
while some Attorneys General in other states have found 
rights not granted by legislatures and have caused legis-
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l:itures to more specifically define conditions for auto-
mobile banking, the Utah Attorney General has stayed 
within the statutory definition of a branch as interpreted 
by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In 19.57 the Attorney General said that a separate 
building separated from the main banking house by 141 
fret and four offices in which a teller was housed for 
receiving deposits is a branch. In 1966 the Attorney 
General said a building separated only by an alley, and 
not housing a teller, but into which a customer may place 
money to be transported to the teller located inside the 
main banking house through a pneumatic tube where the 
teller is able to watch the entire transaction by television, 
is not a branch. 
The significant difference between the two opinions 
is in 1957 the checks were paid and deposits were re-
ceived outside the main banking house. In 1966 the 
depmit was received inside the main banking house. The 
distinction between the bank's agent being outside the 
main banking house and a transaction taking place within 
the main banking house was the basis on which the Court 
found that the outside agent was carrying on a banking 
business in Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 14 
Utah 2d 370, 384 P. 2d 796, and was therefore a branch. 
If the Attorney General had given a different opinion in 
1.966 there may have arisen some question as to whether 
a bank could receive mail deposits since the customer 
loses possession of the money outside the main banking 
l1ouse. But in mail deposits and in the pneumatic tube 
arr:rngement considered by the Attorney General the 
deposit is received by the bank's teller inside its banking 
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house before the depositor receives credit therefor which 
is all that the branch hanking statute requires. 
But in \Valker Bank's additional office at 35 East 
1st North both the customer and the teller are outside tlw 
main branch banking house located at 102 North .1\fain 
when the deposit is made. It is true that the deposit is 
later transferred to the main banking house, but the loan 
papers were also later transferred to the main banking 
house in the Continental Bank case, supra. But the Conrt 
said: 
"\Ve consider the transaction completed and the 
'monev lent' at the time .. the executed note and 
mortg~ge arc delivered to the representative of the 
Bank ... " 
Certainly it cannot be argued that the check is not paid 
when the customer delivers the check to the teller at :3.5 
East 1st North and she delivers cash to him. It seems 
obvious that when the customer delivers cash to the tcll::T 
at 35 East 1st North and she receipts for the cash in the 
depositor's pass book that a deposit is made. Therefore 
since admittedly Walker Bank receives deposits and pa) s 
checks at 35 East 1st North (Tr. 8) it is as much a branch 
as in the Continental Bank case supra. And since it was 
not established pursuant to authority of the State Bank 
Commissioner (Resp. Br. p. 4), it is an unauthorized 
branch bank under the laws of the State of Utah. 
In seeking to make the situation as much like that 
in the 1966 Attorney General's opinion as possible Walker 
Rank emphasizes its claim that only an alley separates 
the additional office from the main bank building (Resp. 
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Br. pp. 3 and 7). Walker Bank seems to be conceding 
that the Utah Branch Banking Statute does not authorize 
,1 separate facility if separated both by an alley and one 
additional office operated by others. If this is so, Judg-
ment should be entered for the Plaintiff. Appellant's 
attorney walks past the Utah Mortgage & Loan Real 
Est1te office located at 15 East 1st North (between 
\V;1lker Bank's branch at 102 North Main and its addi-
tim~al office at 3.5 East 1st North) every day. On August 
15, 1966 Utah Mortgage & Loan were advertizing on the 
~nrne sign that they have been using for years in the win-
dow of this office a five bedroom house in North Logan 
for $22,500. Inside the office was an agent and secretary 
who were receiving Utah Mortgage & Loan customers. 
Respondent claims on page 7 of its brief that it must be 
assnmed it will comply with the terms of the order of 
the lower comt and it claims the lower court ordered it 
to occupy the Utah Mortgage & Loan office when it 
opened its drive-in facility for business. But the drive-in 
facility and Utah Mortgage & Loan were both open for 
husiness on August 15, 1966. All the lower Court's decree 
provides is that the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. 
There is no bar in the court's decree against the continued 
leasing of this office to Utah Mortgage & Loan or any 
other person. 
However, regardless of whether Respondent knows 
if Utah Mortgage & Loan still occupies the office at 15 
East 1st North, it is submitted that a separate office, 
housing a teller who receives deposits and pay checks, 
separated from the branch banking office (by a separate 
business establishment at the time the complaint was 
filed, at the time the court's decree was made, at the time 
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the drive-in facility opened for business, and at the time 
this brief is being written) by a right of way or alley for 
the use of others, and a distance of 134 feet from thr 
branch entrance at 102 North Main to the separate office 
at 35 East 1st North, is a branch under the definition in 
the Utah statute. It is appellant's position that under 
previous decisions of this Court stating that our Branch 
Banking statute is "plain and unambiguous" and "what 
it does not expressly permit, it prohibits" (Walker Bank 
v. Taylor, supra., and Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Taylor, supra.), opinions of the Utah Attorney General 
which thus far have held that if the teller receives the 
deposits at a place other than inside the main banking 
office it is a branch, the better reasoned Federal cases 
interpreting an identically worded Federal Statute (Jack-
son v. First National Bank, supra., and State v. Peoples 
National Bank, supra.) which actually involved adverse 
parties and not two parties desiring the same result as in 
the case of Michigan National Bank v. Saxon, supra., and 
for the other reasons stated in its briefs, such an additional 
office is a branch bank under the definition contained in 
Section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ted S. Perry 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
106 Church Ave. 
Logan, Utah 
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